Jonathan Kuttab The Electronic Intifada 8 March 2022
I have found that speaking to diplomats is often a frustrating experience.

They may be very pleasant and even knowledgeable and sympathetic. But when engaged closely they will repeat the official line.

On Palestine, this line is often a repetition of empty platitudes about supporting the two-state solution and strengthening civil society, but doing little or nothing to oppose Israeli policies that clearly undermine even their own declared government positions.

On 17 February, I met Lisa Stadelbauer, the Canadian ambassador in Tel Aviv. Karen Rodman, executive director of Just Peace Advocates, joined us by video conference, as did Chris Hull, the ambassador’s political adviser.

The ambassador was quite attentive and a good listener, but stuck to the official line as I had foreseen would be the case, and was not readily open to shifting away from the positions favored by Israel. She repeated the position of Justin Trudeau’s government as supporting a two-state solution but also did not seem open to challenging Israel’s continued expansion of settlements which clearly undermines such a position.

When I presented copies of my recent book, Beyond the Two-State Solution, for her in English, Hebrew and Arabic, she told me that while Canada still supported the two-state solution, she realized it was not quite as feasible any more. She said she was surprised to be learning that more and more Palestinians seem to favor a one-state solution.

One thing that had changed since when she was in Israel in the mid-1990s, she said, is that the optimism is gone. I agreed.

Apartheid label upsetting

When I asked about Canada’s reaction to the recent Amnesty International report, she said that Canada’s stance is that the label of “apartheid” is unhelpful, shuts down conversation, and upsets people. She also indicated that apartheid is a legal charge, which should be made by courts.

I said, “Which court? The ICC?”

She nodded.

When I countered by saying that my understanding is Canada is against Palestinians going to the International Criminal Court, she affirmed this to be the case.

“Well, that is a contradiction,” I replied. “We cannot use the word apartheid, unless we go to court, but we cannot go to the court, either?”

Palestinian armed resistance is condemned, but when we take legal avenues or nonviolent tactics like boycotts, divestment and sanctions that too is alleged to be legal and economic terrorism.

She nodded and changed the subject. She is, I must say, a very good listener.

War against human rights

I asked her about the six Palestinian human rights organizations that Israel has declared to be “terrorist organizations.” This was the principal issue I hoped to discuss because I am very proud of the human rights work done by Al-Haq, one of the six designated organizations, which I cofounded in 1979.

She frankly stated that she was glad Canada is not one of the funders of any of the six because that would have made things more difficult and been a problem.

Stadelbauer said that the Canadian government asked for clarifications about this issue and that the country’s intelligence services are discussing the matter with Israeli intelligence officials. No decision has been reached as of yet by the Canadian government.

Then, she added, that when a trusted ally says an organization is a terrorist organization, we must pay attention.

“Exactly,” I said. Which is why you need to insist that any anti-terrorism cooperation with Israel is not used to target civil society organizations.

Israel uses “secret evidence” to justify its actions. That is why you cannot just take their word, but must insist on open facts.

If they have evidence, they should publicly present it before they “decapitate” an organization by labeling it terrorist and making its work impossible.

I referred at this point to the civil court case of Mohammad El Halabi, the former World Vision director for Gaza, for whom my office is the legal counsel. I indicated his case had just been delayed for the 23rd time by Israel’s high court.

“Secrecy” is used to camouflage how thin and unconvincing the evidence against him is.

I pointed out that if Al-Haq can be considered “terrorist” then no civil society can develop or be regarded as safely in place.

The ambassador stressed that Canada believes civil society should be protected and promoted. I said that the labeling of the six organizations is precisely the opportunity to demonstrate Canada means it.

Canada, as Israel’s friend, needs to tell Israelis that they value civil society and the work of organizations they are claiming are “terrorist organizations.” I said that even organizations practicing armed struggle should be encouraged to turn to civil and humanitarian work, rather than be prevented from carrying out such activities because their members in the past used armed struggle.

When I raised my concerns regarding the overreach of the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA) definition of anti-Semitism, the ambassador said Canada supported the definition, and indicated that the definition was a result of a long and thoughtful process by academics and other experts.

She then changed the subject when I raised specifics related to how it would label me as a Palestinian or those who support Palestinian human rights as anti-Semitic for criticism of Israel. Later, I met a diplomatic staff member from Canada’s representative office in the West Bank city of Ramallah, who also indicated the IHRA definition was law in Canada, even though I knew that was not the case.

The definition has merely been included in an anti-racism strategy.

Need for leadership

During my meeting with the ambassador, I stressed that until a political solution is reached, there is considerable leadership Canada could show to promote human rights, such as advocacy for lifting the siege of Gaza, and pushing for elections and democracy.

In regard to Gaza, Stadelbauer mentioned the problem of Hamas. Hamas, I said, must also be brought into the conversation, just as the Palestine Liberation Organization was previously.

She replied that Canada’s policy is not to talk to Hamas.

I also referenced the situation in Area C, which comprises more than 60 percent of the West Bank, including the largest blocs of Israeli settlements.

And Karen Rodman provided information related to challenges to the sale of Palestinian products in Canada. Here, the ambassador indicated she expected we would be in touch with her counterpart in Ramallah.

The ambassador asked me if I thought the current Israeli government was any better than the last one. I said “no,” except for the fact that it is bold and blatant about refusing to let Palestinians have a state, or even negotiate with them.

I also reminded her that Palestinians have not had elections for a long time, and that the present Palestinian Authority has serious problems with credibility and legitimacy among its own people.

Later, when I met Canadian diplomatic staff from Ramallah, there was acknowledgment that many Palestinians feel the two-state solution is no longer viable and this information is shared with superiors in Ottawa.

Our interlocutor from Ramallah stated that diplomatic staff meet often with several of the six designated organizations. She was unable, however, to be at the last session of El Halabi’s legal case, though she attends many trials and hopes to attend future sessions to show concern and solidarity with El Halabi.

All in all, I felt that the position of the Canadian government continues to be solidly pro-Israeli, but that the government and its representatives recognize that there are contradictions leading to Canada not contributing to peace or justice in the area.

At any rate, the ambassador in Tel Aviv and diplomatic staff from Ramallah got to hear my point of view and hopefully will be better prepared when it becomes clear that the status quo is no longer tenable.

Jonathan Kuttab cofounded Al-Haq and is an international human rights lawyer and activist.

Arab Center Washington DC

FEBRUARY 06, 2021

Jonathan Kuttab

Also printed in The New Arab

For many years, based on their own experience in 1948 and 1967, Palestinians have accused Israel of being an apartheid state, while Israel’s defenders have vehemently denied the charge. The discussion usually centers on the occupied Palestinian territories, particularly the West Bank and  East Jerusalem, where over 642,000 Israeli settlers live in settlements under a clearly separate and different set of laws and regulations. The discussion is also often bogged down in comparisons with the former South African apartheid regime, with Israel exhibiting similarities and differences between its own situation and the one that prevailed in South Africa until the early 1990s. Former US President Jimmy Carter created a huge stir in 2006 when he published his book, Palestine: Peace Not Apartheid, and warned that Israel was in danger of becoming an apartheid state if it does not relinquish the occupied territories and allow for the establishment of a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza in accordance with the two-state formula.

The Elements and Context of Apartheid

The discussion was revived recently by a number of factors, including the publication of a report by Israel’s largest human rights organization, B’Tselem. It claims that Israel constitutes a system of apartheid and that the practice is no longer just a feature of the occupied territories but extends to the entire area that lies between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea. This view was bolstered by the wave of discriminatory legislation within the pre-1967 borders that culminated in the Nation State Law of 2018, which confirmed as a Basic Law that Israel is a Jewish state and that only Jews are entitled to self-determination in that state.

Another reason for the renewed interest in this issue is the growing realization that the prospects of a two-state solution for the Palestinian-Israeli conflict are disappearing, that Israeli control over all of historical Palestine has become a reality, and that Israel’s occupation of lands it acquired in 1967 is no longer a temporary situation. Israel’s much-touted success in providing COVID-19 vaccinations to its population, while refusing to give vaccines to most Palestinians under its control, also gave rise to accusations of a “vaccine apartheid.” The Israeli government recently decided to provide Palestinians in East Jerusalem with 5,000 vaccine doses, but none were offered to others in the occupied West Bank and the Gaza Strip.

The truth is that for over half a century, Israel has acted as the real sovereign with full power, authority, and control over all of historical Palestine. Its army controls the whole area as well as its borders, coasts, air space, water resources, and currency. The Israeli Knesset legislates for the entire area and creates, at will, the systems governing it as well. The fact that under Israel’s control, different regimes are applied to the Palestinians living in different parts of the area, and that some authority and responsibility is delegated to the Palestinian Authority (PA) in portions of the occupied West Bank, does not change this reality. This was the case with the creation of Bantustans in South Africa; they did not exempt the country from responsibility for the residents of those areas. They also did not allow the South African regime to claim that it is a democracy within its white areas and that the self-governing Bantustans are “independent” within their prescribed borders.

The question of whether Israel and its leaders are guilty of racial or ethnic segregation should not simply be reduced to a discussion point for political propaganda or public relations. Apartheid today is an international crime for which individual leaders and politicians can be tried before the International Criminal Court (ICC). The Rome Statute, which created the ICC, specifically lists apartheid as a crime and as one of the bases for its jurisdiction. Apartheid is also listed as a “grave breach” in the Geneva Conventions governing people and areas under military occupation. The fact that Israel refuses to accept the applicability of the Geneva Conventions, and often claims that the areas are not truly “occupied” but belong to it under a variety of arguments, only strengthens the urgency to examine Israel’s behavior with respect to the entire area of historical Palestine.

The elements of the crime of apartheid are now a matter of law. A comparison with South Africa may be unfair, and sometimes even to South Africa, as certain elements of the situation in Israel/Palestine are, in fact, even worse in their application. It is therefore important to examine the facts to see if the elements of the crime of apartheid do exist and are found in the state of Israel today.

Apartheid in International Law

The International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid, adopted by the UN General Assembly on November 30, 1973, defines the crime of racial separation. Article II states:

For the purpose of the present Convention, the term “the crime of apartheid,” which shall include similar policies and practices of racial segregation and discrimination as practiced in southern Africa, shall apply to the following inhuman acts committed for the purpose of establishing and maintaining domination by one racial group of persons over any other racial group of persons and systematically oppressing them.

The article goes on to describe a variety of ways in which apartheid is practiced and the inhumane acts that are prohibited, including legislation concerning human rights and freedoms, education, residency and free movement rights, marriage, property, and many other day-to-day practices of groups and communities.

In essence, a careful analysis of the convention shows that there are three elements necessary to find a crime of apartheid: a regime of separation or segregation on the basis of race, creed, or ethnicity; the use of a legal system and legislative measures for enforcement of such separation; and the commission of inhumane acts and violations of human rights and denial of freedoms and forced ghettoization.

Apartheid in Palestinian Areas

In applying these criteria, it is important to take into consideration that the entire area of historical Palestine, between the Mediterranean Sea and the Jordan River, is currently fully controlled by one group, the Israeli government and its military. What often confuses the issue is that Israel has created a number of different regimes of control over Palestinians in that area, with some policies obtaining different terms than others.

Palestinians have been divided into four groups. The first are Palestinian citizens of Israel, who currently have greater freedom of movement (than other groups of Palestinians) and are accorded the right to vote in Israeli Knesset elections, although they experience many inequalities and restrictions in public life. The second group are those Palestinians who reside in East Jerusalem but are not citizens. The third are residents of the rest of the occupied West Bank, and the fourth are the residents of the Gaza Strip. An additional fifth category consists of Palestinian refugees who are simply barred from returning to the country altogether. Each of these groups experiences apartheid differently, but the overall scheme is governed by the same ideology and policy of privileging Jews over non-Jews.

The first group (Palestinian citizens of Israel) were kept under military rule between 1948 and 1966 with their physical mobility and mevement severely restricted and the development of their areas and towns stymied. Laws and zoning regulations were specifically passed with the announced goal of “Judaizing” the Galilee, where most of them live. In the Negev, many Palestinian villages and towns are still not “recognized” and are denied basic services and opportunities to develop normally through zoning regulations, and some of these villages are routinely and repeatedly demolished by the Israeli authorities. The Knesset openly debated whether certain areas in the northeast should be transferred to the Palestinian Authority in a peace deal with the Palestinians, thus unilaterally changing the status of the inhabitants of these areas and depriving them of voting in Knesset elections. Meanwhile, their representatives are deliberately kept out of the policy-making process. An unspoken rule prohibits Palestinian parties from joining any government coalition (it is noteworthy that all governments in Israel, since its creation, have been coalition governments) while any Palestinian party running for elections could be declared illegal if it does not accept the Zionist concept that Israel is a Jewish state. Many laws, capped by the (now constitutional) Nation State Law, confirm this discrimination and enshrine the privileges of Jews over Palestinians, even if the latter are Israeli citizens.

The second group, the East Jerusalemites, has been designated as “residents, but not citizens,” with possible movement to the status of Israeli Palestinian citizens when Israel formally annexed East Jerusalem on July 30, 1980. It is important to note that Jews living in Jerusalem are treated as full citizens, but Palestinians have a unique hybrid status and have been denied the same rights.

The third group in the occupied West Bank is further subdivided geographically into Areas A, B, and C and lives under military occupation. Certain powers and responsibilities in the most densely populated Area A (around 18 percent of the West Bank) have been delegated to the Palestinian Authority, based on the Oslo Accords of the 1990s, as an interim measure lasting five years. However, this case has persisted for a quarter century and shows no prospect of ending soon. Jews—whether citizens of Israel or not—living in the Jewish settlements in Area C, enjoy a totally separate system of laws, courts, police, health, educational and social services, and even a separate road system. Non-Jews cannot enter the areas of the Jewish gated communities without a permit issued by the relevant authorities.

People in Gaza live in what has been called an open-air prison, with Israel controlling air space, the coast, all points of entry and exit, and even the population registry. While, for security reasons, Israel vacated its Jewish settlers from Gaza in 2005, it continues to hold effective power in the area.

Enforcing Apartheid through Legislation

What is significant about these divisions is that it was Israel itself, through its own legislature and army, that has determined the separate regimes and controls what happens in them. The regimes are stipulated in a formal written legislative scheme and are intended to further the control of one group, Israeli Jews, over another—the Palestinian Arab population. The latter group is restricted in its location of residence as well as in its movement and travel, and even between the different areas (Israel, West Bank, Jerusalem, Gaza, and abroad). Numerous checkpoints are placed at intersections between the different areas to ensure the constant separation.

A 29-foot wall that in Israel is actually called “the separation wall” (geder hafrada) has been erected with carefully guarded gates to restrict movement and access. This wall has already been judged illegal by a near unanimous decision of the International Court of Justice in 2004. In addition, Israel has placed signs in Arabic, Hebrew, and English at the entrances of all Palestinian towns in Area A of the occupied West Bank alerting Israelis that it is illegal for them to enter the areas under the control of the Palestinian Authority. While such segregation is not used to prevent entry of Palestinians into these areas, it effectively prevents Jewish Israelis from doing so. The security coordination between Israel and the PA is often utilized to track down such entrances by Jews into Palestinian cities, purportedly for their own protection.

Access to the entire Gaza Strip is severely controlled for both goods and persons; in addition, through agreements with Egypt with respect to the southern border, a full siege that has been in place for the last 14 years has been created. Very limited access is allowed for staff of humanitarian organizations to enter Gaza from Israel; at the same time, Palestinian staff members who hold Israeli passports or East Jerusalem identity cards are almost never allowed in.

The point is that hafrada(Hebrew for separation) is an openly stated policy of the Israeli government and, through different methods of control and segregation, it is intended to further the control over one group by another. Separation, i.e., separate and unequal, is the essential first element in the crime of apartheid.

Legislation to enforce segregation based on race, ethnicity, and religion is the second element and is not haphazard or spontaneous. There are laws, regulations, and military orders that are enforced by Israeli civil and military courts. In Israel, this is legislated in the Knesset both through discriminatory laws that favor Jews as well as by reliance on the old British Emergency Regulations, which are selectively and disproportionately used against Palestinians. Such legislation is also reflected in discriminatory zoning schemes that prevent building and land use by Palestinians except in designated heavily populated areas, at the risk of continuing demolition orders that have become a daily feature of Palestinian life under Israeli control.

There is extensive documentation by Israeli, Palestinian, and international human rights organizations as to the practices used to impose and enforce the segregation regime, which constitute the third element of the crime. These practices include torture and mistreatment of prisoners, administrative detention, demolition of houses (used both as a punitive measure and to prohibit development and residency in restricted areas), restrictions on residency and travel and on the movement of goods and people, and collective punishment. Israel also implements identity card systems and distinctive car license plates to assist the authorities in enforcing the policies of separation. In Israel itself, and in East Jerusalem, the British Emergency Defense Regulations are used as the legal basis for such practices, which are applied by the police and the border patrol. In the other areas, military orders provide the legal basis and are carried out by the army under the Israeli Ministry of Defense.

Such violations of human rights and basic freedoms, while illegal under international law, do not in and of themselves necessarily constitute the crime of apartheid. It is when they are used as a means of controlling and dominating one group (the Palestinians) by another (the Israeli state) that they fulfill the definition of crime of apartheid.

It is therefore abundantly clear that Israel today is an apartheid state fulfilling all the elements of that crime under international law. The temporary and emergency nature of its practices can no longer be used as an excuse. The legislative process that enshrines these policies is clearly of a permanent nature, and it is time for the International Court of Justice to investigate this matter and bring those responsible to justice.

Jonathan Kuttab is a leading human rights lawyer and a Non-resident Fellow at Arab Center Washington DC. He is a resident of East Jerusalem and a partner of Kuttab, Khoury, and Hanna Law Firm there. He is the co-founder of Al-Haq, the first international human rights legal organization in Palestine, and of the Palestine Center for the Study of Nonviolence.

JUNE 16, 2020

Published first in Arab Centre, Washington, DC

Jonathan Kuttab

Few know exactly how the Israeli annexation of certain territories in the occupied West Bank will take place, but it is safe to make some observations based on past experience. In all likelihood, legislation will be passed in the Knesset extending Israeli law and administration to certain areas shown in some attached map. Existing legislation allows such an act to be carried out by an Israeli government administratively and with little fanfare. It is solely the political implications of the action that would necessitate Knesset action, and only by a simple majority. However, reversing the process (that is, ceding land) would require the approval of a supermajority of votes in the Knesset, or 80 out of 120 members.

At a minimum, annexation—or extending Israeli law and administration to parts of the Jordan Valley—will require that Israel update, change, adapt, or reaffirm decrees, laws, and military orders that, since the 1967 occupation of the West Bank, have governed how the occupying power administers the territory and its inhabitants. Such laws, decrees, and military orders address relations with the Palestinians––especially as pertaining to the post-Oslo Accords and Areas A, B, and C––as well as Israeli settlers in illegal settlements, the status of these settlements in Israel’s military doctrine, and economic and social affairs, among other things. But whatever the new regulations may be, annexation is bringing new conditions that are likely to sow the seeds for extended conflict in the future, especially that the Israeli army itself has apparently been kept in the dark as to the particulars of the annexation.

Status of Jewish Settlers

After the supposed annexation, Jewish settlers will be treated exactly as if they are living in Israel de jure (by a lawful right), and not just de facto (by fact, or reality). Those who hold Israeli passports will continue to do so and will be treated as if living in Israel proper. This is significant since Palestinian residents of East Jerusalem have often lost their residency status if they lived in the West Bank, which was considered to be “outside” the state of Israel by the Israeli Ministry of Interior, which controls their status. A prominent case that exemplifies this policy is that of East Jerusalemite Mubarak Awad who, in 1988, lost his case to maintain his residency in East Jerusalem, which had been annexed to Israel following the 1967 war. Israel’s High Court decreed that since Awad was not Jewish and the Law of Return does not apply to him, and since the law annexing Jerusalem failed to define his status, then the Law of Entry into Israel of 1955 applied to Awad and his status was akin to that of an immigrant to Israel, thus making him and other Palestinians living in Jerusalem residents instead of full citizens.

Jews who are in the annexed areas on visas will likely be further pressured to “make aliyah” (officially immigrate to Israel under the Law of Return) and obtain Israeli passports. What will be abandoned are the elaborate mechanisms of adjusting the laws and military orders to enable Jewish settlers to live fully and legally as if they are in Israel when they are technically living in the “administered territories” under the hybrid system of Jordanian Law and Military Orders. They will now be treated de jure as Israelis in Israeli territory. The annexation will have little impact directly on their rights, privileges, and responsibilities.

Palestinians in Annexed Areas

The status of Palestinian Arabs currently living in the areas to be annexed (estimated to number some 107,000 living in 43 villages, according to the Israeli organization Peace Now) is unclear thus far, although Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu declared they will not become citizens of Israel. In fact, he said they will be subjects of the Palestinian Authority. One possibility is that they would be given the same status as that of East Jerusalemites; as such, they would have a category as permanent residents, which is somewhat similar to the holders of “green cards” in the United States. They would be permanent residents who could live and work in Israel but who are not citizens, and they would lose that status if they leave the territory for an extended period of time, including for studying abroad, or if they obtain another citizenship or permanent residency elsewhere (as in Awad’s case).

It is possible, however, that this time, Israel would determine their status in the Knesset law annexing the territories in a way that may grant them a type of status that is markedly different from that applying to Palestinians of East Jerusalem. Perhaps it would authorize granting them special permits to enter and work in the newly annexed areas while continuing to be West Bank residents, in theory subject to the Palestinian Authority (PA) in Ramallah. At one time after the Second Intifada, residents of the Jordan Valley were issued additional permits that they had to carry together with their identity cards that allowed them to enter or reside in the villages of the Jordan Valley. It is also possible that these Palestinians would be pressured immediately, or over time, to leave the newly annexed territories entirely—in other words, they would be ethnically cleansed.

Access to the Annexed Areas

It is expected that access to the new areas will be subject to the same restrictions that apply to entering Israel itself. While West Bank settlements outside of East Jerusalem have been effectively “gated communities” that Palestinians cannot enter without a permit, now all the lands that will be annexed will be subject to the same general permit requirements for entering Israel. New checkpoints will be erected to control movement into the entire Jordan Valley as well as the newly annexed areas, and the movement of the residents of these areas to the rest of the West Bank would also likely be restricted. That means that Palestinians who live there or who have lands they are currently farming in that area would now need some form of permit to continue to live there or to access their lands.

It is also possible that their lands would be expropriated en masse under the rubric of the Absentee Property Law since they will now be “in Israel”: landowners would technically be “absentees” under the definition of Israel’s absentee law. This bizarre outcome was hinted at in the January 2020 Trump plan, “Peace to Prosperity,” when it outlined the possibility of Palestinians being allowed to lease the lands they currently farm in areas that will be annexed. It is also possible that, initially, the status of the land would be left ambiguous with the precise status defined at a later point—that is, if Palestinians decide to assert ownership or challenge settlement expansion into their privately held lands.

Post-Annexation Institutions

In November 1981, Israel’s military commander created a civilian administration to rule the occupied Palestinian territories. Settlers were given different administrative structures in the form of “regional councils” of settlements which were accorded security functions to form their own security units, separate from the army. Israel also granted them direct access to governmental ministries and services, with every effort made to keep their areas as fully functioning Israeli administrative units—even though technically, they were physically and legally outside the state of Israel. At the same time, the entire West Bank was declared a closed military zone and Israel controlled all points of entry into it. Holders of visas or residency in Israel could freely go to the settlements and, if Jewish, they could also reside there. In addition, they could establish industrial zones that were not subject to Israeli environmental regulations and could employ Palestinian workers (though ironically, under the less advantageous Jordanian labor laws). Because of the restricted residence in these settlements to Jews only (whether Israeli citizens or not), settlers could claim many of the advantages of Israeli citizenship including health care, education, security benefits, and the like.

Once annexation takes place, the current status of Jewish regional councils is likely to be strengthened to the full extent of Israeli municipalities, with clear licensing, zoning, and administrative powers. They will enjoy open (and not surreptitious) access to funding and services of Israeli ministries as Israeli “development towns.” Israeli police, health, government, banking, public utilities, and postal services already exist in these settlements, though under questionable authority, since the settlements are “outside” Israel; but now they will be able to enjoy such services de jure. Palestinians residing in these areas and in “enclaves” will be left without services, in a manner similar to those living in unrecognized Arab villages in the Negev and elsewhere in Israel.

As for the Palestinian Authority, it will not be allowed to extend any services to these residents; further, they will not be able to obtain these services in the Jewish settlements. Palestinians in the annexed territories will thus be pressured to physically move to adjacent areas more directly controlled and serviced by the PA. Their inability to build and develop their lands will now be handled under the laws of Israel and the zoning plans and maps of Jewish settlements, rather than Israel’s Civil Administration. Those restrictions already exist since the Civil Administration rarely grants them permits. The problem will now be compounded, however, by the fact that their status under Israeli law is not clear and that they may well be deemed as “absentees” whose very physical presence is in question.

Israeli courts had taken the position that the occupied territories of the West Bank (except for East Jerusalem, and presumably the Golan Heights) are “occupied” under international law, and that the Hague Conventions (though not the Geneva Conventions) on belligerent occupation place some restrictions on how lands in the occupied territories can be used. Some security justification was deemed by Israel’s High Court to be necessary to allow building Jewish settlements on private Arab land (for example, the Elon Moreh case). Furthermore, public lands were supposed to be held in trusteeship until peace comes and their status is resolved. While these restrictions were minimal and usually circumvented, once the annexation takes place no such restrictions will be recognized, thereby allowing the settlements to expand with no internal restraints. The clear conditioning of rights and privileges on whether a person is Jewish or Arab, a well-known phenomenon experienced daily and fully understood by both Israelis and Palestinians, will become a formal legal feature of the landscape.

Apartheid Will Set In

The annexation that is looming in early July will undoubtedly alter Israel’s occupation policies and practices in the West Bank for the worse. While Netanyahu satisfies his political ambition and the voracious appetite of his right-wing supporters, conditions of Palestinians will worsen and international law will find another example of Israeli transgression and banditry. It is the clarity of conditions on the ground in the post-annexation period that will make it impossible to deny that the system of apartheid will have taken another step to being realized as an outcome of occupation. This is the reason why Palestinians, the larger Arab world, and the international community are opposed to annexation. It is also the reason that, importantly, so many liberal and conservative Zionists stand in opposition to it as well.

Jonathan Kuttab is a leading human rights lawyer and a Non-resident Fellow at Arab Center Washington DC. He is a resident of East Jerusalem and a partner of Kuttab, Khoury, and Hanna Law Firm there. He is the co-founder of Al-Haq, the first international human rights legal organization in Palestine, and of the Palestine Center for the Study of Nonviolence.